‘Vassalage’: Deepening Tunisia-Algeria ties spark mounting scrutiny and backlash
The metaphors used by Algerian diplomats leave little room for ambiguity. When Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf was invited to Tunis on 26 January, he was tasked with “conveying to the Tunisian president the greetings of his brother, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune”.
Pushing the familial symbolism further, the statement issued by Algeria’s foreign ministry underlined Tebboune’s desire to deepen the “partnership between the two brotherly countries”. In September, he had welcomed his Tunisian counterpart with the same warmth.
Yet outside official circles, the honeymoon between the two North African states is drawing growing criticism in Tunisia, especially within the ranks of an increasingly repressed opposition.
Backlash against Algerian alleged interference has reached a new peak since the two countries signed a new defence cooperation agreement on 7 October, after months of negotiations.
The deal was signed by Algeria’s army chief of staff, General Said Chengriha, and Tunisia’s Defence Minister, Khaled Sehili.
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Tunisian security sources told Middle East Eye that Sehili travelled to Algiers with a reduced military staff and without any high-ranking officer, likely in part for reasons of confidentiality, while the precise content of the agreement has since then remained entirely secret.
Only sparse details were offered by Sehili to Algerian media, who said the deal aimed to enhance “training and capacity-building, joint exercises, exchange of expertise and intelligence, strengthened joint operations and border security”.
The lack of publicity surrounding the treaty has fuelled fears and speculation about a perceived “vassalage” of Tunisia to the benefit of Algeria, prompting repeated calls for the text to be made public.
Secret military deal
On 31 October, the Committee for the Respect of Liberties and Human Rights in Tunisia (CRLDHT) issued a statement denouncing a “loss of sovereignty”.
Criticism took a more serious turn after the publication on 18 December of a series of images presented as the original leaked treaty.
‘What opened the door to rumours were the absurd choices and policies adopted by Tunisia across all sectors’
- Mohamed Abbou, former Tunisian minister
The seven-page document includes several striking provisions, such as allowing Algerian troops to enter up to 50 kilometres into Tunisian territory, as well as granting the Algerian army the right to intervene should Tunisia’s “institutional stability” be threatened, in order to “restore” it.
Serious doubts have been raised however on the authenticity of the document.
“The leaked document is probably fake,” Tunisian opposition figure and author Hatem Nafti told MEE.
“Still, it fits squarely into the broader trajectory of Tunisia’s vassalage - a process that did not begin with [President] Kais Saied, but has clearly accelerated under his rule,” he added.
Initially circulated on Facebook and X by a large number of accounts, the alleged leaked treaty was later picked up by media in Tunisia and abroad, all presenting the text as a credible source.
President Saied responded swiftly, dismissing the circulating text on 18 December as “entirely fabricated and fictitious documents”. Two weeks later, his Algerian counterpart echoed that position, denouncing “parties seeking to sow discord between Algeria and Tunisia”.
Details about the precise origin of the document have not emerged yet. While actors of the Tunisian opposition to Saied have been cited as a potential source, Moroccan and French outlets close to the kingdom, such as Le360 and Jeune Afrique, were also quick to comment on the leak and amplify the mediatic backlash.
“What opened the door to rumours were the absurd choices and policies adopted by Tunisia across all sectors,” former Tunisian minister Mohamed Abbou told MEE.
“Calls to publish the real treaty or at least a summary could have helped curb disinformation, but the authorities failed to respond,” added the former leader of the opposition Attayar party.
Mourad Chabbi, defence expert and associate professor at Grenoble Management School (GEM) in France, also believes that the backlash surrounding the deal has been fuelled by both states’ poor communication.
“It is striking that when civil society feels sidelined due to a lack of transparency, here in the case of a secret military agreement, it immediately creates space for strong reactions or even for fake news,” he told MEE.
Not ‘on an equal level’
Several Tunisian security sources confirmed to MEE that the document that circulated online was a fake. They noted that more detailed information about its supposed content have since circulated among Tunisian officers.
“The new treaty is an update of a 2001 agreement, particularly through the institutionalisation of intelligence-sharing mechanisms,” Chabbi said.
“After securing the Libyan border through a significant military deployment, and the maritime border through agreements with the European Union, the Tunisian army is now seeking to secure its western flank,” he added.
In 2015, the Tunisian army reinforced its presence along the Libyan border, building earthen barriers and defensive positions to counter infiltration by armed militants. Since then, the system has also been used to curb migrant crossings and cross-border smuggling.
‘[The deal] reflects Algeria’s desire to open up militarily by leveraging Tunisia’
- Mourad Chabbi, defence expert
Meanwhile, following the July 2023 signing of a memorandum of understanding with the EU, the Tunisian coastguard has significantly stepped up its maritime operations.
According to Chabbi, the new agreement will, in return for the help of Algeria to secure the border, pave the way for increased Algerian participation in military training exercises held in Tunisia.
“This also reflects Algeria’s desire to open up militarily by leveraging Tunisia, a US major non-Nato ally that regularly hosts international exercises,” he added.
Given its longstanding dependence on Soviet and later Russian military cooperation, Algeria could benefit from broadening its defence partnerships in such a way.
While the military deal may be less unbalanced than it initially appeared, there remains a stark asymmetry in military power between the two countries: Tunisia ranks tenth on the continent, while Algeria ranks second.
The imbalance is also visible in the field of trade relations, as the Tunisian economy has been suffering from a severe erosion of purchasing power and a deterioration of the state budget since the Covid pandemic.
Once again in 2025, the trade balance proved highly unfavourable to Tunisia, with a deficit of around $1.64bn. Algeria remains Tunisia’s second-largest trade deficit partner, after China.
“Geography and geopolitics being what they are, Tunisia has never dealt with Algeria on an equal level,” Nafti said.
According to him, Tunisia’s alignment with Algiers has also been particularly evident in the diplomatic field, through Saied’s firm support for the Sahrawi independence cause.
Historically the main supporter of the Western Sahara liberation movement, the Polisario Front, Algiers has faced difficulties countering Morocco’s diplomatic offensive aimed at gaining recognition of its sovereignty claims over the region - which Rabbat controls over 80 percent after a military offensive in 1975.
While Tunisia had for decades adopted a position of neutrality on the issue opposing its two other Maghreb neighbours, Saied broke with this long-standing stance of balance. This was particularly illustrated by his hosting of Polisario leader Brahim Ghali in Tunis in 2022, which triggered a backlash in Morocco.
Partners in repression
If the deepening ties between Algeria and Tunisia are being closely scrutinised, it is also because they are part of the authoritarian turn taken by both countries, which have experienced a crackdown on civil society in recent years.
In Algeria, several prominent figures of the 2019-21 pro-democracy Hirak protests have been jailed under Tebboune’s rule, amidst wider violations of human rights, while in Tunisia, many opposition politicians and civil society actors have been detained since the Saied coup in July 2021, through which he concentrated power in his own hands.
The growing closeness between the two leaders has, in practice, favoured Tunisia’s democratic backsliding under Algeria’s auspices.
‘Both [Saied and Tebboune] came to power in the aftermath of social movements that deeply destabilised their country’s security apparatus, and both vowed not to let that happen again’
- Hatem Nafti, Tunisian author
After supporting successive Tunisian governments following the 2011 revolution that toppled long-time autocrat Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Algeria issued only muted calls to “return to the democratic path” after Saied’s power grab.
Since then, the Algerian president has made comments and statements that sometimes sparked controversy in Tunisia, including endorsing Saied’s claims of a “plot against Tunisia” in 2023, as most Tunisian opposition figures began to be jailed on charges of conspiring against the state, or declaring in September 2025 that the two neighbours “are practically one single country”.
Meanwhile, a certain interdependence in democratic repression seems to have developed between the two countries.
In January, Algerian authorities handed over Tunisian opposition figure Seif Eddine Makhlouf - who had fled to Algeria in 2024 - to the Tunisian authorities. The extradition was called out by many NGOs, Amnesty International describing it as an “international law violation”.
The move appears to have come as a return favour for Tunisia’s growing willingness to assist in Algeria’s crackdown on opponents since 2021.
In February 2023, Algerian journalist and opposition activist Amira Bouraoui narrowly avoided extradition to Algeria after being detained by Tunisian police, before being allowed to leave for Paris following intervention by the French authorities.
In 2021, Algerian security services were also accused of carrying out a covert operation targeting opponent Slimane Bouhafs, who had been granted political refugee status in Tunisia. The extent to which the Tunisian authorities were aware of or involved in the operation is unclear.
“The profiles of Kais Saied and Abdelmadjid Tebboune are strikingly similar,” Nafti said.
“Both came to power in the aftermath of social movements that deeply destabilised their country’s security apparatus, and both vowed not to let that happen again.”
Yet, neither Nafti nor Abbou point to any conclusive evidence directly implicating Algiers in active interference in Tunisia’s internal affairs - at this stage.
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